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Abstract 
Two experiments examined how people perceive the diagnosticity of different answers (“yes” and 
“no”) to the same question. We manipulated whether the “yes” and the “no” answers conveyed the 
same amount of information or not, as well as the presentation format of the probabilities of the 
features inquired about. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with only the percentages of 
occurrence of the features, which most straightforwardly apply to the diagnosticity of “yes” 
answers. In Experiment 2, participants received in addition the percentages of the absence of 
features,  which serve to assess the diagnosticity of “no” answers. Consistent with previous studies, 
we found that participants underestimated the difference in the diagnosticity conveyed by different 
answers to the same question. However, participants’ insensitivity was greater when the normative 
(Bayesian) diagnosticity of the “no” answer was higher than that of the “yes” answer. We also 
found oversensitivity to answer diagnosticity, whereby participants valued as differentially 
diagnostic two answers that were normatively equal in terms of their diagnosticity. Presenting to 
participants the percentages of occurrence of the features inquired about together with their 
complements increased their sensitivity to the diagnosticity of answers. We discuss the implications 
of these findings for confirmation bias in hypothesis testing. 
 
 
Keywords: hypothesis testing; answer diagnosticity; insensitivity; oversensitivity; the feature-
positive effect. 
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Insensitivity and Oversensitivity to Answer Diagnosticity in Hypothesis Testing 
An efficient evaluation of the impact of the information that we receive or we acquire is of 
critical importance in many everyday life situations as well as in many professional contexts. 
Consider, for example, the case of a deluded patient who interprets the appearance of a police car in 
the busy street where she is walking as a cue that the police is chasing her. In this case, the patient is 
disregarding the probability that the police is chasing another person and not her (Hemsley & 
Garety, 1986). In other words, the patient fails to value the evidential strength of the incoming 
evidence (the appearance of the police car) under hypotheses that are different from the one she is 
considering. Another way to misweigh evidence is failing to appreciate that the presence of an event 
might convey a different amount of information than its absence (e.g., Cherubini, Rusconi, Russo, 
& Crippa, in press; Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom, 1983; Rusconi, Crippa, Russo, & Cherubini, 2012; 
Rusconi, Marelli, Russo, D’Addario, & Cherubini, in press). For example, an investigator might fail 
to notice that the absence of a suspect’s fingerprints from a crime scene can be more revealing than 
their presence if the suspect was familiar with the victim. Similarly, eyewitness nonidentifications 
might be at least as informative as identifications (e.g., Clark & Wells, 2008; Wells & Lindsay, 
1980). 
The present article is concerned with a specific case of the latter type of failure in evidence 
evaluation. We address the issue of people’s difficulty with perceiving the informativeness that 
“yes” and “no” answers to the same question convey regarding the plausibility of a focal 
hypothesis, that is, of a hypothesis that is being tested. Understanding the psychological 
mechanisms underlying this process is important not only to pursue sound reasoning in scientific 
research, medical diagnosis and legal contexts, but also in more mundane circumstances, such as 
when forming impressions of others (e.g., Evett, Devine, Hirt, & Price, 1994; Fiedler & Walther, 
2004).  
Symmetry and asymmetry in the diagnosticity of answers 
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From a normative (Bayesian) standpoint, different answers (i.e., “yes” and “no”) to the same 
question can differ in the amount of information that they convey (i.e., how diagnostic they are). 
When testing the hypothesis that a new acquaintance is an extrovert you might ask her “Do you 
enjoy parties?”. A “yes” answer to this question is about as informative as a “no” answer. Indeed, if 
the new acquaintance replies “yes”, you will be about as confident that she is an extrovert as you 
will be about her introversion after a “no”. This type of questions has been called “symmetric” 
because there is symmetry in the amount of information conveyed by the two possible answers 
(Cameron & Trope, 2004; Cherubini, Rusconi, Russo, Di Bari, & Sacchi, 2010; Trope & Liberman, 
1996; Trope & Thompson, 1997). In contrast, if you ask “Do you organize parties at your home 
each week?”, a “yes” answer would provide you with more information about your new 
acquaintance’s extroversion than a “no” answer about her introversion. People can be extroverts 
even if they do not organize parties at their home each week. Thus, a “no” should not disconfirm 
strongly the extroversion hypothesis that you are testing, while a “yes” should confirm it relatively 
strongly. For this reason, this type of question has been labeled “asymmetric”, more specifically 
“asymmetrically confirming” (e.g., Cameron & Trope, 2004; Cherubini et al., 2010; Trope & 
Liberman, 1996; Trope & Thompson, 1997). Conversely, an asymmetrically disconfirming question 
implies that the disconfirming answer is more informative than the confirming answer. For 
example, asking “Do you enjoy being alone on Saturday night?” to test one’s extroversion implies 
anticipating a hypothesis-disconfirming (“yes”) answer that is highly informative about the target’s 
introversion and a hypothesis-confirming answer (“no”) that is not as informative about the target’s 
extroversion (e.g., Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011, Study 2; Trope & Thompson, 
1997). Figure 1 illustrates the equal or the differential diagnosticity (represented by the solid 
arrows) of the “yes” and “no” answers that follow symmetric and asymmetric tests, respectively. 
Failure in evaluating appropriately the informativeness of different answers to the same 
question might lead to inefficiencies in belief revision. In fact, “optimal revision of initial beliefs 
INSENSITIVITY TO ANSWER DIAGNOSTICITY 5
depends on the diagnosticity of the specific answers received” (Slowiaczek, Klayman, Sherman, & 
Skov, 1992, p. 393). 
Bayesian background 
A widely used criterion for belief updating is Bayes’ theorem, which provides a 
mathematical expression of how people should revise their initial confidence in a focal hypothesis 
in light of new evidence. A simple formulation of Bayes’ theorem is given by the following 
equation in terms of odds (e.g., Beyth-Marom & Fischhoff, 1983; Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom, 
1983):  
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )HDp
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where, “p()” means “probability of”, “|” should be read as “given that”, “H” stands for the 
focal hypothesis, “¬H” for the alternate (“¬” is the logical symbol for negation), and “D” indicates 
the new evidence. From the left of the equation, there are three terms: (1) the posterior odds, that is, 
the ratio of the probability that the focal hypothesis is true after receiving the new evidence to the 
probability that the alternate is true given the same evidence; (2) the prior odds that the focal 
hypothesis, rather than the alternate, is true prior to receiving the new evidence; (3) the likelihood 
ratio (LR henceforth), that is the ratio of the probability of occurrence of the new evidence given 
that the focal hypothesis is true to the probability of occurrence of the same evidence given that the 
focal hypothesis is false (and thus the alternate is true). 
How to evaluate the informativeness of answers 
From Bayes’ theorem one can derive directly two measures of the evidential strength of a 
datum, namely the LR and the log LR (e.g., Cherubini et al., 2010; Good, 1950, 1979; McKenzie, 
2004; Slowiaczek et al., 1992). However, Nelson’s (2005, 2008) studies on information gathering 
pointed out some flaws of these metrics. Other measures of the value of obtained evidence have 
been proposed in the psychological literature (e.g., Crupi, Tentori, & Gonzalez, 2007; 
Mastropasqua, Crupi, & Tentori, 2010; Nelson, 2005, 2008; Tentori, Crupi, Bonini, & Osherson, 
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2007). Among them, Probability Gain is a measure of error reduction that was found to best capture 
people’s intuitions about information acquisition (Nelson, McKenzie, Cottrell, & Sejnowski, 2010; 
see however Meier & Blair, 2013 for findings showing people’s preference for efficiency over 
Probability Gain). Whenever the prior probabilities of the hypotheses are equal, the values of utility 
predicted by Probability Gain are identical to those of another metric, Impact. This measure 
quantifies the absolute change in beliefs from the prior to the posterior probabilities of the 
hypotheses (e.g., Nickerson, 1996). In particular, the Impact of a “yes” answer (or, in an equivalent 
form, the evidential value of the presence of a feature) can be expressed as follows (see e.g., 
Nelson, 2005, Appendix A):  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }HpDHpHpDHp ¬−¬+−× ||21  
while the Impact of a “no” answer (or the evidential strength of the absence of a datum) is 
computed as:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }HpDHpHpDHp ¬−¬¬+−¬× ||21  
When there are two exhaustive and mutually exclusive hypotheses, the Impact of a “yes” 
answer reduces to: 
( ) ( )HpDHp −|  
while the Impact of a “no” answer can be computed as: 
( ) ( )HpDHp −¬|  
Consider, for example, the planetary scenario introduced by Skov and Sherman (1986, see 
also Garcia-Marques, Sherman, & Palma-Oliveira, 2001; McKenzie, 2004, 2006; Nelson, 2005, 
2008; Nelson et al., 2010; Sacchi, Rusconi, Russo, Bettiga, & Cherubini, 2012, Study 3; Slowiaczek 
et al., 1992; Villejoubert & Mandel, 2002). On an imaginary planet, Vuma, there are two kinds of 
inhabitants—Gloms and Fizos—which are equally numerous (i.e., the prior probability of 
encountering a Glom or a Fizo is .5) and invisible to human sight. The only way to identify the 
creatures is by asking about some features they possess. Participants are told the distribution of 
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probabilities of the features across Gloms and Fizos. For example, participants are told that 90% of 
Gloms and 50% of Fizos drink gasoline. By applying Bayes’ theorem, we can calculate the 
posterior probabilities of encountering either a Glom or a Fizo after the receipt of an answer to the 
question about drinking gasoline. If the tester receives a “yes” answer, the posterior probability that 
the encountered creature is a Glom in light of this answer is ( ) 64."|" =yesGlomp , whereas the 
posterior probability that the creature is a Fizo given the same answer is ( ) 36."|" =yesFizop . If the 
tester receives a “no” answer to the question about drinking gasoline, the posterior probability that 
the encountered creature is a Glom given this answer is ( ) 17."|" =noGlomp , while the posterior 
probability that the creature is a Fizo given the same answer is ( ) 83."|" =noFizop . In this example 
we consider two exhaustive and mutually exclusive hypotheses, therefore an answer confirms one 
hypothesis to the same extent as it disconfirms the other (e.g., Nelson, 2005; Nickerson, 1996). 
Accordingly, in this example, the formula for Impact reduces to the absolute value of the difference 
between the posterior probability of either hypothesis and .5 (that is, the prior probability of either 
hypothesis). In particular, the Impact of a “yes” answer is |.64-.5| = |.36-.5| = .14, while the Impact 
of a “no” is |.83-.5| = |.17-.5| = .33. Thus, the “no” (disconfirming) answer is more informative than 
the “yes” (confirming) answer and for this reason the question about drinking gasoline is 
asymmetrically disconfirming. 
Evidence of insensitivity to differentially diagnostic answers 
Although the Bayesian literature on evidence evaluation is large (e.g., Beach, 1968; 
Casscells, Schoenberger, Graboys, 1978; Christensen-Szalanski & Bushyhead, 1981; Cosmides & 
Tooby, 1996; Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom, 1983; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Hammerton, 1973; 
McKenzie, 1994; Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971; Villejoubert & Mandel, 2002), only a few studies 
have directly investigated how people revise their beliefs in light of different answers to the same 
question (McKenzie, 2006; Skov & Sherman, 1986; Slowiaczek et al., 1992). Overall, they showed 
that people appreciate that a “yes” and a “no” answer can convey different amounts of information, 
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but they underestimate this difference in tasks with abstract materials. This phenomenon has been 
called “insensitivity to answer diagnosticity” (Slowiaczek et al., 1992). The first evidence of such 
insensitivity came from a study outlined by Skov and Sherman (1986) in the discussion of their 
seminal work (p. 118). Only 43% of participants showed the asymmetry of confidence in the 
normatively expected direction after a “yes” answer and after a “no” answer, and many were not 
asymmetric enough. Slowiaczek et al. (1992) found that, on average, participants estimated a 
difference of 6% between the posterior probability judgments after a “yes” and after a “no”, while 
the normative difference was 19% (Experiment 1A, Slowiaczek et al., 1992). McKenzie (2006) 
replicated the findings of the study by Slowiaczek et al. (1992), but only with abstract materials 
(i.e., planetary scenarios). When participants were presented with familiar materials (i.e., scenarios 
about male and female heights) the extent of insensitivity to differentially diagnostic answers 
decreased. Although the familiarity of the materials used in the experiments turned out to be an 
important moderator of people’s sensitivity to the differential diagnosticity of answers, it remains 
unclear how people behave in tasks with abstract materials.  
Skov and Sherman (1986) hinted at a possible relation between people’s failure to perceive 
the asymmetry in informativeness of different answers and the failure to consider base rates 
( ( )Hp ), but they did not develop this idea or test it empirically1. Slowiaczek et al. (1992) advanced 
an explanation based on participants’ confusion of the assessment of answer diagnosticity with the 
assessment of question usefulness, which, according to the authors, might be related to the use of 
the representativeness heuristic (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
Indeed, a shortcut that approximates the formal evaluation of question diagnosticity is the “feature-
difference heuristic” (in fact, it is tantamount to Impact; Nelson, 2005, footnote 2; Nelson, 2009; 
Nelson et al., 2010; Slowiaczek et al., 1992). According to this shortcut, the most useful query is the 
one about a feature whose probability of occurrence is maximally different under two competing 
hypotheses. That is, the question with the highest diagnosticity is the one about a feature for which 
( ) ( )HDpHDp ¬− ||  is maximized2. Note that this shortcut for assessing question diagnosticity 
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entails the consideration of the constituent probabilities of the LR, that is, one of the possible 
measures of answer diagnosticity (e.g., Cherubini et al., 2010; Good, 1950, 1979; McKenzie, 2004; 
Nelson, 2005; Slowiaczek et al., 1992). Indeed, on Nozick’s account the difference between 
likelihoods is considered a measure of evidential support (e.g., Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; 
Schum, 1994). Several studies have shown that people are sensitive to the formal diagnosticity of 
questions (e.g., Cherubini et al., 2010; Skov & Sherman, 1986; Slowiaczek et al., 1992; Trope & 
Bassok, 1982). Thus, Slowiaczek et al. (1992) argued that people do not perceive sufficiently the 
difference in the diagnosticity of “yes” and “no” answers to the same question because the 
difference between the constituent probabilities of the LR is the same for both “yes” and “no” 
answers. That is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )HDpHDpHDpHDp ¬¬−¬=¬− ||||  
It should be noted that all previous studies focused on the differential impact of answers to 
asymmetric questions, for which a “yes” is more informative than a “no” or vice versa. Indeed, 
there are no empirical investigations of whether people perceive that the “yes” and “no” answers 
following a symmetric question convey the same amount of information. The two experiments 
presented in this article are aimed, in part, at filling this gap. This issue is relevant because it might 
clarify whether people’s relative insensitivity to the differential diagnosticity of answers indicates 
only a tendency to perceive different answers as equally diagnostic (i.e., underestimation of 
differential evidence strength), or also as a failure to appreciate when different answers convey the 
same amount of information (i.e., oversensitivity to differential evidence strength), thus representing 
a more general failure in information use. Furthermore, oversensitivity to answer diagnosticity has 
implications for confirmation bias in hypothesis testing, defined as a tendency to apportion more 
confidence than warranted to the focal hypothesis (e.g., McKenzie, 2004, 2006), as we will describe 
in the General Discussion. 
More generally, taking into account the type of question (symmetric, asymmetrically 
confirming, or asymmetrically disconfirming) is important to elucidate the mechanisms underlying 
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people’s sensitivity to answer diagnosticity. Indeed, Slowiaczek et al. (1992, Experiment 1A) found 
greater insensitivity to answer diagnosticity when the answers came from asymmetrically 
disconfirming questions and thus when the “no” was more diagnostic than the “yes”. Data from 
their Experiment 1A (see Slowiaczek et al., 1992, Table 2, p. 396) reveal that the estimated 
difference between “yes” and “no” diagnosticities was 4% for the 50%-90% combination and 2% 
for the 90%-50% combination. In contrast, when the answers came from asymmetrically confirming 
queries, and thus the “yes” was more diagnostic than the “no”, participants were more sensitive to 
the differential diagnosticity of answers. Indeed, when the percentage combinations were either 
50%-10%, or 10%-50%, the estimated difference between the informativeness of “yes” and “no” 
answers was 11%. From a normative (Bayesian) perspective, the difference is 19% for all 
percentage combinations (see Figure 2). This finding was not discussed by Slowiaczek et al. (1992) 
and is not accounted for by their explanation of insensitivity to answer diagnosticity. Indeed, the 
difference between the probabilities that constituted the LR was always 40% for both “yes” and 
“no” answers and for all the percentage combinations that the authors used. Accordingly, 
participants in Slowiaczek et al.’s (1992) study should have exhibited insensitivity to answer 
diagnosticity to the same extent regardless of the specific percentage combination that they 
received. The experiments presented in this article addressed this issue and add to the hypothesis-
testing literature in two ways: 
1. by considering symmetric tests, that is, the cases in which the “yes” and “no” 
answers are equally diagnostic (Experiments 1 and 2); 
2. by using a presentation format that make explicit the likelihoods of feature absence 
in addition to the likelihoods of feature presence (Experiment 2). 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
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One-hundred and ten undergraduate students at the University of California, San Diego 
(66% female, mean age 20.1 years, range 18-28 years) took part in the experiment in exchange for 
course credit. 
Materials and procedure 
We set up a planetary scenario similar to the one originally introduced by Skov and Sherman 
(1986) and thereafter widely used in the literature on hypothesis testing (e.g., Garcia-Marques et al., 
2001; McKenzie, 2004, 2006; Nelson, 2005, 2008; Nelson et al., 2010; Sacchi et al., 2012, Study 3; 
Slowiaczek et al., 1992; Villejoubert & Mandel, 2002). Specifically, we asked participants to 
imagine traveling to a planet, Vuma, where there is an equal number of two kinds of creatures, 
called Gloms and Fizos. Participants were presented with the answers to some questions about a 
series of features which Gloms and Fizos possess with different probabilities. The task was to 
surmise whether an encountered creature was a Glom (or a Fizo, according to the version of the 
questionnaire) based on the priors (50% of the creatures on the planet are Gloms, 50% are Fizos), 
the distributions of probabilities of the features inquired about, and the answers (i.e., “yes” or “no”) 
to the questions asked about these features (a sample stimulus is given in Appendix A). 
We employed a 4 × 2 × 2 × 2 design. Within-participants variables were the type of test (test 
1 about a feature with probabilities of .98 and .50 under the two hypotheses, respectively; test 2: 
.50-.02; test 3: .65-.35; test 4: .85-.15; see Table 1) and the answer that participants received (“yes” 
vs. “no”), whereas between-participants factors were the test order (test 3-“yes”, test 4-“no”, test 1-
“yes”, test 2-“no”, test 3-“no”, test 4-“yes”, test 1-“no”, test 2-“yes”, and the reverse order) and the 
focal hypothesis (Glom vs. Fizo). Thus, there were four versions of the questionnaire and each 
participant responded to eight problems, each presented on a separate page of the booklet. In 
particular, participants were asked to estimate the chances in 100 that the encountered creature was 
a Glom [Fizo] for each problem. 
The tests were chosen so that there were two questions (tests 1 and 2) for which the “yes” 
and “no” answers conveyed a different amount of information. In test 1 the “no” answer was more 
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diagnostic than the “yes” answer and vice versa in test 2 (see Table 1). In other words, the question 
about the 98-50 feature (test 1) was asymmetrically disconfirming, while the query about the 50-2 
feature (test 2) was asymmetrically confirming. These types of tests have already been used in 
previous research on insensitivity to answer diagnosticity, thus they were potentially useful to 
replicate the finding of an underestimation of the differential diagnosticity of “yes” and “no” 
answers to the same question. In addition, participants were presented with “yes” and “no” answers 
to symmetric questions, for which the “yes” answer was exactly as informative as the “no” answer. 
As can be seen in Table 1, both “yes” and “no” answers to test 3 have Impact of .15, while both 
“yes” and “no” answers to test 4 have Impact of .35. Thus, the only difference between these two 
tests lies in the informativeness of the answers to them: Both “yes” and “no” answers are more 
diagnostic following test 4 than following test 3. This allowed us to check whether participants were 
sensitive to variations in the amount of information conveyed by the answers they received, 
everything else kept constant. Furthermore, although tests 3 and 4 did not allow us to assess 
whether participants underestimated the difference in diagnosticity between different answers, they 
could show whether they were calibrated or they were oversensitive to it.  
Results 
Following the procedure used by Slowiaczek et al. (1992) and McKenzie (2006), we 
recoded participants’ estimates with respect to the hypothesis favored by the answer. For example, a 
participant might receive a “no” answer to test 2 (about the 50-2 feature) under the “Glom” focal 
hypothesis and she/he might provide an estimate of 30% chance that the encountered creature is a 
Glom. This would be recoded as a 70% chance of encountering a Fizo. The hypothesis normatively 
supported by “yes” answers was always Glom, while it was always Fizo after “no” answers (see 
Table 1). Accordingly, we recoded four of the eight estimates for every participant. 
Using this dependent variable, we performed a 4 × 2 × 2 × 2 mixed design ANOVA. 
Within-participants variables were test type (tests 1-4) and the answer participants received (“yes” 
vs. “no”), while between-groups factors were test order (one order and its reverse) and focal 
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hypothesis (Glom vs. Fizo). The normative prediction is that there should be a significant main 
effect of test type but not of answer and there should be a significant test type × answer interaction. 
We present the results concerning these effects here, while we refer the reader to Appendix B for a 
description of the other findings. 
There was a significant main effect of test type, F(1,105) = 14.78, MSE = 943.75, p < .001, 
η2 = .027, lower-bound correction. The pair-wise comparisons revealed a pattern which is consistent 
with normative considerations. Indeed, as we should expect by applying Bayes’ rule (see the 
normative values in Table 1), participants gave higher estimates after an answer to test 4 (M = 68, 
SDE = 1.6), than after answers to test 1 (M = 63.4, SDE = 1.5), p = .015, and answers to tests 2 and 
3, ps < .001. Furthermore, there was no significant difference in the estimates after receiving the 
answers to asymmetric tests, that is, the answers to test 1 and the answers to test 2 (M = 61, SDE = 
1.6), p = .283. Finally, participants provided significantly lower estimates after answers to test 3 (M 
= 56.9, SDE = .8) compared to all other tests, ps ≤ .013. However, Figure 3 shows that participant 
estimates were overall lower than the normatively expected values. 
Contrary to the normative prediction, there was a significant main effect of the answer, 
F(1,105) = 8.09, MSE = 1621.55, p = .005, η2 = .025, lower-bound correction, indicating that 
participants found “yes” answers (M = 66.2, SDE = 1.5) more informative than “no” answers (M = 
58.4, SDE = 1.8). This finding is shown also by the slopes of the four data lines in Figure 3 which 
indicate an almost identical trend.  
The test type × answer interaction was not significant, F(1,105) = 1.33, MSE = 788.70, p = 
.251. This lack of effect is not normatively grounded: Looking at Figure 3 it is apparent that the 
normative prediction for the two asymmetric tests is a steep slope (top panels), while for the 
symmetric tests is a flat slope (bottom panels). 
Using the same dependent variable described above, we performed a series of one-sample t-
tests comparing the normatively (Bayesian) expected and the observed difference between 
probabilities after a “yes” and probabilities after a “no” for each test. In particular, we computed the 
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observed difference for each test by subtracting the estimate after a “no” from the estimate after a 
“yes” for each participant. A positive difference means that participants gave more weight to the 
“yes” answer, and a negative difference implies greater weight assigned to the “no” answer. We 
computed the theoretical Bayesian difference in the same manner. There is a normative difference 
of -30 for the asymmetrically disconfirming test (test 1), of 30 for the asymmetrically confirming 
test (test 2), and no difference for symmetric tests (tests 3-4).  
For the asymmetrically disconfirming question (98-50 feature), the mean estimated 
difference of 5.6 (SD = 38) was significantly lower than the normative difference of -30, t(109) = 
9.83, p < .001, d = .94. Note that participants tended to value more the “yes” than the “no” answer. 
Thus, they tended to perceive an asymmetry in the opposite direction compared to the normatively 
expected direction (Figure 3, top left panel). For the asymmetrically confirming question (50-2 
percentage combination), the mean difference of 10.4 (SD = 50.2) was significantly less than that 
normatively expected of 30, t(109) = -4.1, p < .001, d = .39 (Figure 3, top right panel). 
For test 3 (the 65-35 feature), the mean difference in the estimates after a “yes” and after a 
“no” (M = 5.5, SD = 32.5) was higher than the normatively expected difference of 0, although only 
marginally, t(108) = 1.78, p = .078, d = .17 (Figure 3, bottom left panel). Similarly, for test 4 (85-15 
feature), the mean difference in the estimates after a “yes” and after a “no” (M = 8.2, SD = 39.2) 
was significantly higher than the normatively expected null difference, t(109) = 2.19, p = .031, d = 
.21 (Figure 3, bottom right panel).  
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1 replicate the findings of previous studies that pointed out 
people’s insensitivity to answer diagnosticity when the “yes” and “no” answers come from 
asymmetric queries. The results extend previous findings by showing that people tend to be 
oversensitive to answer diagnosticity when the “yes” and “no” answers are equally diagnostic, that 
is, when they come from a symmetric question.  
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For the asymmetric tests, the estimated difference between the diagnosticities of “yes” and 
“no” answers was underestimated compared to the Bayesian difference. That is, participants were 
insufficiently sensitive to differentially diagnostic answers. As in Slowiaczek et al. (1992), we 
found a different magnitude of such insensitivity as a function of the type of asymmetric question 
from which the answers came. In particular, as in Slowiaczek et al.’s (1992) study, participants in 
our study appreciated less the difference in diagnosticity between the “yes” and “no” answers for 
the asymmetrically disconfirming question (98-50 combination, Figure 3, top left panel) than for the 
asymmetrically confirming question (50-2 combination, Figure 3, top right panel). The greater 
insensitivity to answer diagnosticity for the asymmetrically disconfirming test is apparent because 
participants tended to exhibit an asymmetry in the counternormative direction (see Figure 3, top left 
panel). As for symmetric tests, participants perceived a difference in informativeness between the 
“yes” and the “no” answers when actually they were equally diagnostic. In particular, they 
perceived “yes” answers as more diagnostic than “no” answers.  
Both oversensitivity to answer diagnosticity, when the answers came from symmetric 
queries (tests 3-4), and the different magnitude of insensitivity found for asymmetric questions 
(tests 1-2) contradict Slowiaczek et al.’s (1992) explanation of insensitivity to answer diagnosticity. 
According to Slowiaczek et al. (1992) people perceive the “yes” and “no” answers as more similar 
in diagnosticity than they actually are because the difference between the constituents of the LR is 
the same for both answers. However, the difference was identical in the two asymmetric tests that 
we used. In particular, the difference was 48% for both “yes” and “no” answers for both asymmetric 
tests. Furthermore, in the case of each symmetric test, the difference between the constituent 
probabilities of the LRs was the same for “yes” and “no” answers. Specifically, the difference was 
30% for test 3 and 70% for test 4. If people subtract the percentages that constitute the LR when 
evaluating answer diagnosticity, then participants in our study would have noticed that not only the 
percentage differences but also the percentages by themselves were identical for the “yes” and “no” 
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answers in the case of symmetric tests. Thus, they should have valued equally the “yes” and “no” 
answers to symmetric tests. 
The main effect of test type revealed that participants weighed most the answers following 
the most diagnostic question (test 4, 85-15 combination), and they weighed least the answers 
following the least diagnostic query (test 3, 65-35 combination), while the answers to asymmetric 
tests (tests 1-2) fell in between3. This finding indicates that participants were sensitive to the 
diagnosticity of the questions. Interestingly, the metrics proposed in the literature for computing the 
diagnosticity of a question are based on the expected outcomes, that is, they are weighted averages 
of the diagnosticities of the “yes” and “no” answers to that question (see e.g., Nelson, 2005, 
Appendix A; Nickerson, 1996)4. Participants might have perceived that the answers following a 
question were on average more, less, or equally diagnostic compared to the answers following 
another question, but they failed to perceive the relative weight of the specific answers (“yes” 
versus “no”) following a question.  
For each question, participants were affected more by “yes” answers compared to “no” 
answers. This finding is revealed by the significant main effect of answer and is evident in Figure 3. 
In other words, participants seemed as though they were influenced by a form of the feature-
positive effect, whereby people overweigh the presence, as opposed to the absence, of features (e.g., 
Cherubini et al., in press; Jenkins & Sainsbury, 1969, 1970; Newman, Wolff, & Hearst, 1980; 
Rusconi, Crippa, et al., 2012; Rusconi et al., in press). This finding is in keeping with Slowiaczek et 
al.’s (1992) study, in which the authors found that participants weighted the “yes” answers more 
than the “no” answers regardless of their actual informativeness in Experiments 1A, 2B, and 2C.  
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 addressed the issue of a possible effect of the format of the presented 
information on participants’ estimates after a “yes” and after a “no”. In Bayesian terms, the ability 
to differentiate (or equate, in case of symmetric tests) the “yes” and the “no” answers in terms of 
their different (equal) informativeness entails the computation of both the LR for the “yes” answer 
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and for the “no” answer. People might encounter more difficulties in considering the LR for “no” 
than for “yes” when evaluating answers because of the well-known difficulty to process negative 
information relative to positive information (e.g., Cherubini et al., in press; Hearst, 1991; Van 
Wallendael, 1995; Wason, 1959, 1961). Participants in Experiment 1 had to calculate from the 
presented percentages their complements to compute the LRs for “no” answers. This required a 
further step of processing compared to the evaluation of the impact of “yes” answers. Accordingly, 
we hypothesized that by adding the probabilities of the absence of the features to the probabilities of 
their presence participants would be more sensitive to the actual informativeness of “yes” and “no” 
answers. We tested this hypothesis in Experiment 2. Formally speaking, participants in Experiment 
1 were presented with ( )HDp | , where “H” stands for both the hypotheses (i.e., both Gloms and 
Fizos), while in Experiment 2 they received both ( )HDp |  and ( )HDp |¬  (see Appendix A; this 
procedure was drawn from Cherubini et al., in press; see also Rusconi, Crippa, et al., 2012, Study 
3).  
Method 
Participants 
Ninety-four undergraduate students at the University of California, San Diego (68% female, 
mean age 20.2 years, range 17-28 years) took part in the experiment in exchange for course credit. 
Materials and procedure 
Design, materials, instructions and procedure were exactly the same as in Experiment 1, 
with the exception of the addition of the probabilities of the absence of the features beside the 
probabilities of their presence (see Appendix A). For instance, when presenting to participants test 2 
we gave them both the 50-2 percentage combination, indicating the probabilities of the presence of 
the feature (i.e., drinking gasoline) in Gloms and Fizos, and its complement, the 50-98 combination, 
indicating the probabilities of the absence of the same feature in the two groups. 
Results 
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We used the same recoding of participants’ estimates used in Experiment 1 (see also 
McKenzie, 2006; Slowiaczek et al., 1992). We subjected the recoded estimates to the same 4 × 2 × 
2 × 2 mixed design ANOVA run in Experiment 1. We remind the reader that, according to Bayes’ 
theorem, there should be a significant main effect of test type, but not of answer, and there should 
be a significant test type × answer interaction. As in Experiment 1, we report the results concerning 
these effects here while we present the description of the other findings of the ANOVA in Appendix 
C. We found a significant main effect of test type, F(1,90) = 23.01, MSE = 784.58, p < .001, η2 = 
.053, lower-bound correction, showing that participants’ estimates were higher for test 4 (M = 73.7, 
SDE = 1.5), than for all other test types, all ps < .001. Furthermore, there was not a significant 
difference in the estimates after receiving the answers to asymmetric tests, that is, the answers to 
test 1 (M = 65.7, SDE = 1.5) and the answers to test 2 (M = 66.1, SDE = 1.6), p = .819. Finally, 
participants provided significantly lower estimates for test 3 (M = 59.9, SDE = .8) than for all other 
test types, all ps < .001. Although the pattern is similar to the one found in Experiment 1, the 
estimates are overall higher, as shown in Figure 3. 
Contrary to the normative prediction, and as in Experiment 1, there was a significant, 
although weaker, main effect of answer, F(1,90) = 5.52, MSE = 947.87, p = .021, η2 = .015, lower-
bound correction, reflecting greater weight assigned to the “yes” answer (M = 69, SDE = 1.4) than 
to the “no” answer (M = 63.7, SDE = 1.6).  
Crucially, and contrary to Experiment 1, there was a test type × answer interaction, F(1,90) 
= 8.05, MSE = 633.30, p = .006, η2 = .015. Pair-wise comparisons showed that only for test 2 (50-2 
combination) there was a significant difference between the estimates after a “yes” (M = 73, SDE = 
2.1) and the estimates after a “no” (M = 59.2, SDE = 2.3), p < .001. In contrast, test 1 (98-50 
combination) was perceived as though it was symmetric, because the difference between the 
estimates after the “yes” (M = 65.5, SDE = 2.1) and after the “no” (M = 65.8, SDE = 2.3) was not 
significant, p = .917. As for test 3 (65-35 combination), the difference between participants’ 
estimates after a “yes” (M = 61.9, SDE = 1.3) and after a “no” (M = 57.9, SDE = 1.5) did not reach 
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statistical significance, p = .099. Also for the other symmetric test (85-15 combination) the 
difference between the estimates after a “yes” (M = 75.5, SDE = 1.8) and after a “no” (M = 71.9, 
SDE = 2.3) was not significant, p = .233. It should be noted that, overall, participants’ responses in 
this experiment are closer to Bayesian responses, compared to Experiment 1 (see Figure 3). 
Following the same procedure used in Experiment 1, we performed a series of one-sample t-
tests to compare the Bayesian and the observed difference between probabilities after a “yes” and 
probabilities after a “no” for each test type. For asymmetric tests, we found again an insensitivity to 
answer diagnosticity although weaker than in Experiment 1. Specifically, the mean difference of -.6 
(SD = 33.5) between estimates after the “yes” and estimates after the “no” following the 
asymmetrically disconfirming question (98-50 feature) was significantly less than the normative 
difference of -30, t(93) = 8.51, p < .001, d = .88. Nonetheless, compared to Experiment 1, 
participants tended to value the diagnosticity of the “no” answer more appropriately (Figure 3, top 
left panel). Furthermore, the mean perceived difference of 13.4 (SD = 36.3) when the question was 
asymmetrically confirming (50-2 feature) was significantly less than the normative difference of 30, 
t(93) = -4.44, p < .001, d = .46 (Figure 3, top right panel). 
Contrary to Experiment 1, we found that the difference between participants’ estimates after 
the “yes” and after the “no” answers for symmetric tests did not differ significantly from the 
normatively expected null difference. In particular, the mean difference between the estimates after 
a “yes” and those after a “no” for test 3 (65-35 combination) (M = 3.8, SD = 26.9) was not 
significantly different from the normatively expected difference of 0, t(93) = 1.36, p = .178 (Figure 
3, bottom left panel). In a similar vein, for test 4 (85-15 percentage combination), the mean 
difference between the estimates after the “yes” and the estimates after the “no” (M = 3.4, SD = 31) 
was not significantly different from the Bayesian null difference, t(93) = 1.05, p = .298 (Figure 3, 
bottom right panel). 
Discussion 
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Experiment 2 indicated that participants tended to exhibit a symmetry of estimates when 
evaluating “yes” and “no” answers to symmetric tests (tests 3-4). Indeed, both the pair-wise 
comparisons and the follow up t-tests revealed that the difference in the estimates after the “yes” 
and “no” answers to symmetric tests was not significantly different from the normatively expected 
null difference. The answers to the asymmetrically disconfirming query (about the 98-50 feature) 
were perceived as equally diagnostic, too, but there was a slight tendency to perceive a greater 
weight of the “no” versus the “yes”, in line with the normative direction of the asymmetry (see 
Figure 3, top left panel). Furthermore, participants perceived differently the “yes” and “no” answers 
to the asymmetrically confirming question (50-2 percentage combination).  
Overall, participants benefited from the manipulation of the presentation format of the 
probabilistic information that they received. Presenting to participants both the percentages that are 
useful to compute the LR for the “yes” answers and their complements, that are used to compute the 
LR for the “no” answers, had the effect of sensitizing them to answer diagnosticity. Indeed, contrary 
to Experiment 1, the test type × answer interaction was significant, indicating that participants did 
not value the diagnosticities of “yes” and “no” answers in the same way regardless of the question 
from which the answers came.  
As in Experiment 1, participants provided the highest estimates after receiving the answers 
to the most diagnostic question (test 4, 85-15 combination), the lowest estimates when the answers 
came from the least diagnostic query (test 3, 65-35 combination), while the estimates after the 
receipt of the answers to asymmetric tests (tests 1-2) fell in between. The significant main effect of 
test type revealed this finding. However, participants’ sensitivity to the differential diagnosticity of 
questions leaves unresolved why they are insensitive to answer diagnosticity. Indeed, the different 
magnitude of insensitivity to answer diagnosticity found for the asymmetrically confirming versus 
the asymmetrically disconfirming test runs counter to Slowiaczek et al.’s (1992) explanation based 
on people’s confusion of answer diagnosticity assessment with question diagnosticity assessment. 
In fact, for both types of asymmetric tests the difference in the percentages that constitute the LR 
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was 48% for both “yes” and “no” answers and the two asymmetric questions were equally 
diagnostic regardless of the specific metric used to assess question usefulness. Furthermore, 
according to this account, presenting both the percentages that are useful to compute the LR for the 
“yes” answer and those relative to the “no” answer should have decreased, instead of increased, 
participants’ sensitivity to differential answer diagnosticity when the answers came from 
asymmetric tests because participant could straightforwardly determine that the differences in the 
LR constituents were identical for the “yes” and “no” answers. 
In contrast, what seemed to underlie participant residual insensitivity to answer diagnosticity 
was the tendency to weigh more the “yes” answers compared to the “no” answers. This 
interpretation is supported by the significant main effect of answer (see also Figure 3). Nonetheless, 
this effect was weaker than in Experiment 1, probably reflecting the debiasing effect of the 
manipulation of the presentation format of the percentage combinations. 
General Discussion 
Two experiments showed that people can value two answers (“yes” and “no”) to the same 
question as differentially informative although they are equally diagnostic (and equally frequent, 
see Figure 1) from a normative (Bayesian) standpoint. That is, we provided evidence for people’s 
oversensitivity to answer diagnosticity when the answers come from a symmetric question. We also 
provided evidence for the reliability of the insensitivity to answer diagnosticity found in previous 
similar studies. Indeed, when the “yes” and “no” answers to a question convey a different amount of 
information (i.e., when the question is asymmetric), people tend to perceive the two answers as 
more similar in terms of their diagnosticity than they actually are. However, both the findings of 
previous studies (see Figure 2) and the data presented in this article (see Figure 3) indicate that 
insensitivity to answer diagnosticity varies as a function of the type of question.  
In particular, we found greater insensitivity for the asymmetrically disconfirming question 
(98-50 combination) than for the asymmetrically confirming question (50-2 combination). That is, 
participants had more difficulties in perceiving that a “no” answer was more informative than a 
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“yes” answer (as it is the case for the 98-50 test) than vice versa (as it is in the case for the 50-2 
combination). This finding cannot be explained in terms of participants’ confusion of the 
assessment of answer diagnosticity with the assessment of question usefulness (Slowiaczek et al., 
1992). According to this explanation, people perceive two answers as more similar than they 
actually are because the difference between the probabilities that constitute the LR is the same for 
both “yes” and “no” answers. However, in our experiments the difference between the percentages 
was 48% for both “yes” and “no” answers regardless of whether the question was asymmetrically 
confirming or asymmetrically disconfirming. In fact, the two asymmetric tests were equally 
diagnostic. Rather, the greater difficulty in belief updating in light of the answers to the 
asymmetrically disconfirming question reveals people’s tendency to overweigh the evidential 
strength of “yes” versus “no” answers. We found this form of the feature-positive effect (e.g., 
Cherubini et al., in press; Jenkins & Sainsbury, 1969, 1970; Newman et al., 1980; Rusconi, Crippa, 
et al., 2012; Rusconi et al., in press) in both experiments, as revealed by the significant main effects 
of answer. This finding is in keeping with previous similar experiments (Slowiaczek et al., 1992, 
Experiments 1A, 2B, and 2C). 
Taking into account whether the question asked is asymmetrically confirming or 
asymmetrically disconfirming when investigating answer diagnosticity assessment has implications 
for confirmation bias, that is, the tendency to apportion unwarranted confidence to the focal 
hypothesis (e.g., McKenzie, 2004, 2006). The current knowledge about confirmation bias indicates 
that it originates from a combination of biases at the testing stage and biases at the evaluation stage 
of hypothesis development (e.g., McKenzie 2004, 2006; Klayman, 1995; Poletiek, 2001). It has 
been argued that one of these combinations is the preference for asking asymmetrically 
disconfirming questions and a failure to perceive that the hypothesis-disconfirming answer to this 
kind of questions is more diagnostic than the hypothesis-confirming answer (e.g., McKenzie, 2004, 
2006; Klayman, 1995; Slowiaczek et al., 1992). In our experiments, participants failed to perceive 
the greater diagnosticity of the disconfirming “no” answer compared to the confirming “yes” 
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answer to test 1 (98-50 combination). Therefore, we found corroborating evidence for the bias in 
the evaluation part of this testing/evaluation combination. 
Some authors have argued that confirmation bias can originate from a preference for asking 
asymmetrically confirming questions (e.g., Cameron & Trope, 2004; Poletiek & Berndsen, 2000; 
Trope & Thompson, 1997). For example, Trope and Thompson state: “The testing strategy becomes 
biased in favor of the hypothesis when the questions are asymmetric, namely, when hypothesis-
consistent answers are more diagnostic than hypothesis-inconsistent answers” (Trope & Thompson, 
1997, p. 240), that is, when the questions are asymmetrically confirming. Note that, from a 
Bayesian perspective, a highly diagnostic outcome is rare whenever the prior probabilities of the 
hypotheses being considered are equal (see Figure 1, also see the diagnosticity/frequency trade-off, 
e.g., McKenzie, 2006; Poletiek, 2001, chaps. 1 and 2; Poletiek & Berndsen, 2000; Rusconi, Sacchi, 
Toscano, & Cherubini, 2012; Sacchi, Rusconi, Bonomi, & Cherubini, in press). Accordingly, an 
asymmetrically confirming query cannot foster confirmation bias because the hypothesis-
confirming answer is more rare than the hypothesis-disconfirming answer although it is more 
diagnostic. However, according to these authors, when tasks activate strong a priori beliefs (e.g., 
stereotypes) this diagnosticity/frequency trade-off might not occur because “strong category-based 
expectancies increase the subjective likelihood that the target will provide the more diagnostic 
expectancy-consistent answer rather than the less diagnostic expectancy-inconsistent answer” 
(Trope & Thompson, 1997, p. 230). In other words, people would perceive that a hypothesis-
confirming answer to an asymmetrically confirming question is both highly diagnostic and highly 
likely, thus confirmation bias would be possible. The insensitivity that we found for the 
asymmetrically confirming query (test 2, 50-2 combination), if replicated under the circumstances 
explained above, would weaken confirmation bias. Indeed, participants in our experiments did not 
value the hypothesis-confirming “yes” answer as more diagnostic than the hypothesis-disconfirming 
“no” answer as much as we would expect based on normative considerations.  
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Hence, while insensitivity to answer diagnosticity might favor confirmation bias when 
combined with an asymmetrically disconfirming testing strategy, it might have a debiasing effect in 
some circumstances (e.g., intergroup contexts) when it is combined with an asymmetrically 
confirming testing strategy.  
Slowiaczek et al. (1992) argued that “symmetrical questions (70-30, 20-80) are not prone to 
the inferential errors we document, because “yes” and “no” answers are equally diagnostic” 
(Slowiaczek et al., 1992, p. 402). The authors probably referred to the errors due to the combination 
of asymmetrically disconfirming testing and insensitivity to answer diagnosticity described above. 
However, another combination that might lead to confirmation is positive testing (asking questions 
about features which are more likely to occur if the focal hypothesis is true than if it is false) and the 
feature-positive effect in the evaluation stage of hypothesis development (e.g., Klayman, 1995; 
McKenzie, 2004, 2006). We found evidence for the feature-positive effect because people weighed 
more the “yes” answers than the “no” answers to symmetric queries in Experiment 1. Therefore, 
oversensitivity to answer diagnosticity (in the form of assigning more weight than warranted to 
“yes” compared to “no” answers) combined with a preference for asking symmetric positive 
questions can also lead to confirmation bias. 
Our experiments also add to the literature by showing that insensitivity and oversensitivity 
to answer diagnosticity in abstract tasks of hypothesis testing is moderated by the presentation 
format of the percentages given to participants. The feature-positive effect found in Experiment 1 
suggests that participants might have difficulty in assessing the diagnosticity of “no” answers. 
Indeed, “no” answers require a further step of processing compared to “yes” answers: People have 
to calculate the complements of the percentages that constitute the LR for “yes” answers. In 
Experiment 2, we presented to participants the percentages needed to compute the LR for “yes” 
answers along with their complements. This manipulation had a debiasing effect. Participants were 
still affected by the feature-positive effect, but to a lesser extent than in Experiment 1. Contrary to 
Experiment 1, the test type × answer interaction was significant, indicating that participants 
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appreciated that the relative weight of “yes” and “no” answers differed as a function of the type of 
question. In fact, contrary to Experiment 1, participants exhibited the symmetry of estimates that we 
would expect for normative reasons in the case of symmetric tests (65-35 and 85-15 features). For 
the asymmetrically disconfirming question (98-50 feature), there was a slight tendency to perceive 
the greater informativeness of the “no” answer compared to the “yes” answer. Finally, for the 
asymmetrically confirming question (50-2 feature), the insensitivity was less pronounced compared 
to Experiment 1. These findings suggest that people’s difficulty to revise in a Bayesian way their 
initial beliefs in light of different answers to the same question might reside, at least in part, in the 
failure to infer correctly the likelihoods of the non-occurrence of the features inquired about.  
More generally, the present data suggest that people’s non-Bayesian use of the obtained 
evidence in this kind of task might be due to two reasons. First, overall, participants’ revisions in 
light of the received answers appeared to be conservative (e.g., Edwards, 1968; Phillips & Edwards, 
1966), that is, their posterior probability estimates were closer to the prior probability of .5 than 
normatively expected (see Figure 3). Second, participants found the “yes” answers more 
informative than the “no” answers, that is, they exhibited a feature-positive effect (e.g., Cherubini et 
al., in press; Jenkins & Sainsbury, 1969, 1970; Newman et al., 1980; Rusconi, Crippa, et al., 2012; 
Rusconi et al., in press).  
Newman et al. (1980) proposed that the feature-positive effect might have evolved because 
occurrences of natural events are relatively rare and thus more informative than non-occurrences of 
events. Accordingly, one can hypothesize that participants in our experiments had difficulties in 
processing the words-and-numbers scenarios and thus they might have exploited their knowledge 
about real-world relationships. If this is the case, they might have assumed that feature presences 
(i.e., “yes” answers) were rare and thus more informative than feature absences (i.e., “no” answers; 
e.g., McKenzie & Chase, 2012; McKenzie & Mikkelsen, 2000, 2007; for a discussion of this 
argument see McKenzie, 2006, p. 580).  
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In conclusion, we showed that people’s insensitivity to answer diagnosticity is more 
malleable than previously argued (e.g., Slowiaczek et al., 1992). Taking into account the type of 
question from which the answers come revealed that people not only exhibit insensitivity but also 
oversensitivity to answer diagnosticity. Furthermore, insensitivity to answer diagnosticity per se is a 
more nuanced phenomenon than previously thought. Indeed, people are less sensitive when the 
normative diagnosticity of “no” answers is higher than that of “yes” answers than vice versa. 
Finally, the way in which the relevant information is presented to participants might enhance their 
sensitivity to the amount of information that the answers convey. Further empirical investigations 
are in need to elucidate the mechanisms underlying evidence evaluation in hypothesis testing. In the 
current experiments, for example, we used an unfamiliar scenario and previous studies have shown 
that sensitivity to answer diagnosticity increases when familiar materials are used (McKenzie, 
2006). However, biases observed using abstract materials did not disappear or reverse with concrete 
materials (McKenzie, 2006). Thus, results using abstract materials might provide a useful guide of 
what to expect when using concrete materials. Furthermore, they suggest possible ways to reduce 
inefficiencies in evidence evaluation in the specific situations in which previous knowledge does 
not play a key role and contextual cues are limited and uncertain, as it might be when professionals 
have to evaluate statistical write-ups.  
In the present experiments, we used words-and-numbers scenarios. This is not the 
information format that most enhances Bayesian reasoning (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; 
Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Meder & Nelson, 2012; Nelson, 2009). Therefore, it remains to be 
investigated whether other formats, such as icon arrays (e.g., Galesic, Garcia-Retamero, & 
Gigerenzer, 2009), or allowing participants to learn the environmental probabilities through 
experience (e.g., Meder & Nelson, 2012; Nelson, 2009; Nelson et al., 2010) have a greater 
debiasing effect. Finally, future studies might consider individual differences in insensitivity and 
oversensitivity to answer diagnosticity. In particular, it would be interesting to investigate whether 
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statistical numeracy (assessed, for example, through the Berlin Numeracy Test introduced by 
Cokely, Galesic, Schulz, Ghazal, and Garcia-Retamero, 2012) moderates such phenomena. 
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Footnotes 
1 We can speculate that the authors wanted to hint at the account of the phenomenon they 
subsequently gave in the study co-authored with Slowiaczek (Slowiaczek et al., 1992), that was 
based on the use of the representativeness heuristic (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1972, 1973; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Indeed, the use of this strategy entails neglecting prior probabilities 
(e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
2 In the Bayesian reasoning literature, there are other examples of the use of this (or similar) 
strategy in belief revision. Indeed, one of the three most frequent non-Bayesian algorithms that 
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) found in problems using the standard probability format or the 
relative frequency format was the “likelihood subtraction”, that is, ( ) ( )HDpHDp ¬− || . 
Moreover, Hoffrage and Gigerenzer (1998) found that physicians asked to estimate the positive 
predictive values of diagnostic problems frequently used a strategy similar to the feature-difference 
heuristic when information was presented in form of probabilities. Indeed, one of the two most 
prevalent strategies when physicians did not reason according to Bayes’ theorem was the difference 
between the sensitivity of a test (i.e., ( )HDp | ) and the false-positive rate of the test (i.e., 
( )HDp ¬| ). Note that the likelihood subtraction, also known as ∆R, has been long known as a 
strategy used in covariation assessment (e.g., Jenkins & Ward, 1965; McKenzie, 1994). 
3 The diagnosticity of the questions that we used in our task followed this decreasing order: Test 4 
(85-15 combination) > test 1 (98-50 combination) = test 2 (50-2 combination) > test 3 (65-35 
combination). This order is derived both from the application of the feature-difference heuristic and 
from the calculation of question diagnosticity according to several norms (namely 
Log10Diagnosticity, Information Gain, Kullback-Leibler distance, Probability Gain, and Impact, see 
e.g., Nelson, 2005, 2008). However, an exception is the expected maximum LR (e.g., Good, 1950), 
often called Bayesian Diagnosticity (e.g., Nelson, 2005, 2008, 2009), according to which the least 
useful question is test 3 (65-35 combination), as for the other norms, but the most useful queries are 
the asymmetric tests (tests 1-2) not test 4 (85-15 combination). 
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4 The idea of selecting questions to ask based on the weighted average of the utilities of the possible 
outcomes was suggested by Alan Turing (1912-1954) in 1940 (cited in Good & Card, 1971, p. 182) 
and then by Good (1950). In a similar way, Savage (1954) proposed to use expected subjective 
utility to select questions. One exception to this approach based on the weighted average of the 
expected outcomes’ utility is presented in Martignon, Katsikopoulos, and Woike (2008). These 
authors proposed to use “fast and frugal trees” for categorization in contexts with limited resources. 
These trees are heuristics that bypass the computation of probabilities and define the diagnosticity 
of a question on the basis of the best-possible outcome, that is, the possible outcome that would be 
the most useful. 
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Table 1 
The Structure of the Problems Used in the two Experiments  
 
 
 Answer Likelihoods Impact/Probability Gain 
Hypothesis 
supported by 
the answer 
Normative 
probabilities in the 
supported hypothesis 
test #1 
yes .98/.5 .16 Glom .66 
no .02/.5 .46 Fizo .96 
test #2 
yes .5/.02 .46 Glom .96 
no .5/.98 .16 Fizo .66 
test #3 
yes .65/.35 .15 Glom .65 
no .35/.65 .15 Fizo .65 
test #4 
yes .85/.15 .35 Glom .85 
no .15/.85 .35 Fizo .85 
 
Note. Participants in Experiment 1 were presented only with the likelihoods (in the form of 
percentages) relative to the “yes” answer, that is, ( )GlomDp |  and ( )FizoDp | , while in 
Experiment 2 they received both the likelihoods relative to the “yes” answer and those relative to 
the “no” answer (always in the form of percentages), that is, ( )GlomDp | , ( )FizoDp |  and their 
complements ( )GlomDp |¬  and ( )FizoDp |¬ . 
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Figure 1. Examples of symmetric and asymmetric questions when inquiring about the bipolar 
dimension of extroversion-introversion (assuming equal priors). In these examples, the focal 
hypothesis is extroversion while the alternate is introversion. Arrows point to the dimension of the 
bipolar trait favored by the answer. Solid arrows indicate the degree of diagnosticity of yes and no 
answers: The longer the arrow, the higher the answer’s diagnosticity is. In contrast, dashed arrows 
indicate the frequency of yes and no answers: The longer the dashed arrow, the more likely the 
answer is. Note that whenever the prior probabilities of the hypotheses (e.g., introversion and 
extroversion) are equal there is always a trade-off between frequency and diagnosticity, whereby 
likely answers are less diagnostic than unlikely ones.
yes (disconfirming the focal hypothesis) 
yes (confirming the focal hypothesis) 
SYMMETRIC QUESTIONS 
e.g., “Do you enjoy parties?” 
Introversion Extroversion 
yes no 
Frequency 
ASYMMETRICALLY CONFIRMING QUESTIONS 
e.g., “Do you organize parties at your home each week?” 
Introversion Extroversion 
no 
ASYMMETRICALLY DISCONFIRMING QUESTIONS 
e.g., “Do you enjoy being alone on Saturday night?” 
Introversion Extroversion 
no 
Diagnosticity 
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Figure 2. Normative probabilities and mean estimated probabilities of the hypothesis normatively 
favored by the evidence drawn from Experiment 1A by Slowiaczek et al. (1992, Table 2, p. 396). 
The measures of variability for participants’ estimates were absent in the original article. Note that 
participants were insensitive to answer diagnosticity for all tests. Indeed, normative slopes are 
steeper than participants’ slopes for all the four tests shown in the figure. However, participants 
exhibited greater insensitivity to answer diagnosticity when the answers came from asymmetrically 
disconfirming tests (90-50 and 50-90 features) than when they came from asymmetrically 
confirming tests (50-10 and 10-50 features). 
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Figure 3. Estimates (in the form of percentages) of the hypothesis favored by the evidence. The 
participants’ mean estimates are compared with the Bayesian responses. For participants’ mean 
estimates, standard error of the mean (SEM) bars are also shown.      
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Appendix A 
Sample Stimulus from Experiments 1 and 2 
Imagine that you have traveled to a planet called Vuma, where there are two types of invisible 
creatures, Gloms and Fizos. Both types are equally common. That is, 50% of creatures are Gloms 
and 50% are Fizos. You are told the proportion of Gloms and of Fizos who possess a certain 
feature. You meet eight creatures and you are asked to estimate the likelihood that it is a Glom 
[Fizo] based on their answers to a question about a feature. Assume that each creature truthfully 
answers “yes” or “no” to the question. 
Imagine you encounter a creature. Recall that on the planet Vuma 50% of creatures are Gloms and 
50% are Fizos.  
Experiment 1 version: 
  Have gills 
Gloms  65%   
Fizos  35%   
Experiment 2 version:  
           Have gills 
  YES  NO 
Gloms  65%  35%  
Fizos  35%  65%   
The creature is asked: “Do you have gills?”.  
It answers: “Yes, I do”. 
Please estimate the chances in 100 that this creature is a Glom [Fizo]. 
There are _____  chances in 100 that this creature is a Glom [Fizo]. 
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Appendix B 
Report of the other Effects emerged from the ANOVA performed in Experiment 1 
The significant main effect of the answer was qualified by a significant answer × focal hypothesis 
interaction, F(1,105) = 54.49, MSE = 1621.55, p < .001, η2 = .170, lower-bound correction, 
indicating that, when the focal hypothesis was Glom the “no” answer (M = 70.7, SDE = 2.5) had 
more impact than the “yes” answer (M = 58.4, SDE = 2.1), while when the focal hypothesis was 
Fizo the “yes” answer (M = 74, SDE = 2.1) had more impact than the “no” answer (M = 46.1, SDE 
= 2.5). This pattern is opposite to the normatively expected one because under the Glom focal 
hypothesis “yes” answers lead to higher posterior probabilities than “no” answers for all tests, while 
under the Fizo focal hypothesis the reverse holds true (see Table 1). Note, however, that this finding 
probably originates as a byproduct of our recoding of the dependent variable.    
As expected normatively, there was no effect of test order, F(1,105) = .34, MSE = 759.39, p 
= .563. However, there was a significant main effect of the focal hypothesis, F(1,105) = 5.77, MSE 
= 759.39, p = .018, η2 = .001, with higher estimates provided when the focal hypothesis was Glom 
(M = 64.5, SDE = 1.3) than when it was Fizo (M = 60.1, SDE = 1.3). This finding is in contrast with 
the application of Bayes’ rule because the posterior probabilities are overall balanced across focal 
hypotheses (see Table 1). This effect was qualified by a significant test type × focal hypothesis 
interaction, F(1,105) = 33.64, MSE = 943.75, p < .001, η2 = .061, lower-bound correction. Pair-wise 
comparisons revealed that estimates were significantly higher when the focal hypothesis was Glom 
(M = 74.6, SDE = 2.1) rather than Fizo (M = 52.1, SDE = 2.1), p < .001, for the 98-50 test. In 
contrast, estimates were significantly higher when the focal hypothesis was Fizo (M = 66.7, SDE = 
2.3) rather than Glom (M = 55.2, SDE = 2.3), p = .001, for the 50-2 test. This pattern of results 
relative to asymmetric tests is opposite to the normative one: Estimates should be higher under the 
Fizo focal hypothesis than under the Glom focal hypothesis for the 98-50 test, and vice versa for the 
50-2 test (see Table 1). Again, note that our recoding of the dependent variable might explain the 
counternormative findings concerning the effect of focal hypothesis. However, there were no 
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significant differences between the estimates under the Glom hypothesis and those under the Fizo 
hypothesis for either of the symmetric tests, ps ≥ .123, a finding that is consistent with the 
application of Bayes’ rule (see Table 1). 
There were other significant interactions, which we report without further discussion for the 
sake of concision and because they were tiny effects. Specifically, there were significant three-way 
interactions among test type, answer and focal hypothesis, F(1,105) = 4.07, MSE = 788.70, p = 
.046, η2 = .006, lower-bound correction, and among test type, answer and test order, F(1,105) = 
5.79, MSE = 788.70, p = .018, η2 = .009, lower-bound correction. Finally, the three-way interaction 
among test type, test order and focal hypothesis was marginally significant, F(1,105) = 3.34, MSE = 
943.75, p = .070, η2 = .006, lower-bound correction. 
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Appendix C 
Report of the other Effects emerged from the ANOVA performed in Experiment 2 
There was a significant interaction between answer and focal hypothesis, F(1,90) = 43.00, MSE = 
947.87, p < .001, η2 = .120, lower-bound correction, showing that when the focal hypothesis was 
Glom, the “no” answer (M = 71.2, SDE = 2.2) was weighed heavier than the “yes” answer (M = 
61.7, SDE = 1.9), p = .003, while when the focal hypothesis was Fizo, the “yes” answer (M = 76.3, 
SDE = 2) shifted the estimates more than the “no” answer (M = 56.3, SDE = 2.2), p < .001. The 
pattern shown by this interaction mimics the one found in Experiment 1 and is opposite to the 
normative prediction because we would expect higher posterior probabilities after “yes” answers 
than after “no” answers under the Glom focal hypothesis, and the reverse under the Fizo focal 
hypothesis (see Table 1). Again, this finding might be a byproduct of our recoding of the dependent 
variable. 
As expected normatively, neither the main effect of focal hypothesis nor the main effect of 
test order were significant, Fs < 1. However, as in Experiment 1, there was a significant test type × 
focal hypothesis interaction, F(1,90) = 59.52, MSE = 784.58, p < .001, η2 = .138, lower-bound 
correction, which followed only partially the normative prescription. Indeed, pair-wise comparisons 
revealed that estimates were higher under the Glom focal hypothesis (M = 78.1, SDE = 2.2) than 
under the Fizo focal hypothesis (M = 53.2, SDE = 2.2), p < .001, for the 98-50 test, while we would 
expect the opposite for normative reasons. Indeed, posterior probabilities under the Fizo focal 
hypothesis are overall higher than those under the Glom focal hypothesis (see Table 1). 
Furthermore, estimates were higher under the Fizo focal hypothesis (M = 75.5, SDE = 2.3) than 
under the Glom focal hypothesis (M = 56.8, SDE = 2.2), p < .001, for the 50-2 test. Again, Bayes’ 
rule predicts the opposite pattern (see Table 1). However, as in Experiment 1, estimates did not 
differ significantly under the two focal hypotheses for both symmetric tests, ps ≥ .088, consistent 
with the normative prediction (see Table 1).  
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Finally, there was a significant three-way interaction among answer, test order and focal 
hypothesis, F(1,90) = 4.00, MSE = 947.87, p = .048, η2 = .011, lower-bound correction, which will 
not discuss further for the sake of concision and because the effect was small. 
